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Federal Tort Claims Act Summarized
Russell E. Ake*
T o ATTEMPT A BRUEr summary of the Federal Tort Claims Act
may be likened to an attempt to explain atomic energy in
ten words. But such a summary may be of some usefulness to
our esteemed adversaries-the plaintiff's counsel in F. T. C. A.
cases.
Like most statutes, both state and federal, the text of this
Act is encompassed within a few paragraphs. Then there follows
a welter of interpretations, exceptions, and constructions. How-
ever, I shall attempt to hit the high spots and see if we can't
come at least to a general understanding of what it's about and
what it means.
Suit by Consent Only
Now, a tort is a tort, whether state or federal, and the word
means simply "the infringement of a right or the violation of a
duty." 1 The remedies for such a wrong exist in every state's
procedure, either by common law or by statute. The United
States of America, however, being a sovereign entity, enjoys its
sovereign immunity from suit and protects its rights zealously.
For example, consider the language in Pflueger v. United
States:2 ". . . the immunity of the sovereign from suit is para-
mount, even over rights founded in the Constitution." And
equally as forceful, we find in Lynch v. United States:3  .. . The
sovereign's immunity from suit exists whatever the character of
the proceeding or the source of the right sought to be enforced.
It applies alike to causes of action arising under acts of Con-
gress . . . and to those arising from some violation of rights con-
ferred upon the citizen by the Constitution . . . immunity from
suit is an attribute of sovereignty which may not be bartered
away."
* First Assistant United States Attorney, Northern District of Ohio; for-
merly a Deputy of the Probate Court of Stark County, Ohio, at Canton;
formerly First Assistant City Solicitor of Canton; and a niember of the
Ohio Bar.
1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 1181 (1 vol. ed., 1928).
2 Pfleuger v. United States, 121 F. 2d 732, 73 App. D. C. 364 (App. D. C.,
1941).
3 Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, 581, 582, 54 S. Ct. 840, 844 (Ga., 1934).
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It follows that the sovereign, enjoying such immunity, also
has the inherent power to waive that immunity when and as
often as it sees fit. Such consent is never to be implied, however.
It is of strictly statutory origin. That the Federal Government
cannot be sued without its specific consent is one of the funda-
mental principles of law supported by, as I always enjoy stating
in a brief, "cases too numerous to mention." Of this, In Re
GreenstreetP said: "the sovereign immunity from suit is a right
and privilege which can be divested only by specific congres-
sional enactment so providing."
Thus, prior to June 25, 1946, the only way a recovery in tort
could be had against the United States was by the passage of a
special bill authorizing payment. These bills were allowed to
accumulate, and usually the last congressional act prior to ad-
journment was their consideration. It had become a "you scratch
my back and I'll scratch yours" proposition-which could hardly
be called a sound administration of justice. The need for bold
new legislation on the matter of waiver of immunity had become
obvious.
In the Federal Tort Claims Act, we do have just such a
congressional waiver or consent, embodied in what is now Title
28, United States Code, Section 1346 (b), which reads as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the
district courts, together with the District Court for the
territory of Alaska, the United States District Court for the
District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the
Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil ac-
tions on claims against the United States, for money dam-
ages, accruing on or after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss
of property, or personal injury or death caused by the neg-
ligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in ac-
cordance with the law of the place where the act or omis-
sion occurred."
Now, as is not at all unusual, as one soon learns in dealing
with federal statutes, Section 1346 merely authorizes the United
States to become a defendant, and then sends us to another book
for the provisions of Chapter 171, of Title 28, which becomes
Title 28, Section 2671 and subsequent sections.
4 In Re Greenstreet, Inc., 209 F. 2d 660 (C. A. 7, 1954).
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol6/iss2/12
F. T. C. A. SUMMARIZED
Section 2671 confines itself to definitions. Section 2672
briefly provides for administrative settlement of claims under
$1,000.00, and says that acceptance of the award is conclusive
as to all parties. Title 28, Section 2673 requires an annual report
to Congress by the head of each federal agency, listing all claims
paid by it under Section 2672 of this title. Section 2674 declares
the freedom of the United States from liability for interest prior
to judgment, or from liability for punitive damages.
Title 28, Section 2680 is of particular interest to the plain-
tiff's attorney, in that it sets out specific exceptions to the other-
wise sweeping waiver of sovereign immunity, the more pertinent
of which are those claims specified in Section 2680 (h): "Any
claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, mis-
representation, deceit, or interference with contract rights."
There are additional sections, but the gist of the matter lies
in the ones quoted. So we find the consent to be sued.
Construction
The courts, realizing how wide the doors might be opened
by the Federal Tort Claims Act, and in order to sten a possible
flood of litigation, held, as in United States v. Webb Trucking
Co.,5 that: "It is clear that the United States is immune from
suit except as it has consented to be sued, and statutes waiving
immunity are construed not only strictly in favor of the Govern-
ment but narrowly and literally." Or, as was said in California
Cas. Indemnity Exchange v. United States: 6 "The United States
may not be sued without its consent; such consent must be given
by an Act of Congress; when such consent has been thus given
the conditions of suit set forth in the Act must be complied with,
even though they be purely formal; and such act must be strictly
construed in -favor of the United States."
The general trend, however, as numerous cases indicate, has
been to a generally more liberal construction. To use the words
of our own Judge Paul Jones,7 in a recent case: "the Government
must assume its responsibilities and cannot attempt to hide be-
hind a Federal Agency."
5 U. S. v. Webb Trucking Co., 141 F. Supp. 573 (D. C. Del., 1956).
6 California Cas. Indemnity Exchange v. U. S., 74 F. Supp. 404 (D. C. Calif.,
1947).
7 Federal District Court, Northern District of Ohio.
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Effect of the Statute
You and I are primarily interested in the effect the Federal
Tort Claims Act has on our clients, and on us as practicing law-
yers. Its prime effect is that, with the activities of millions of
federal employees, in the staggering number of modern Govern-
mental enterprises, a vast and entirely new field of recovery now
is opened.
Take a few simple illustrations. For instance, how many
Government-owned or Government-operated motor vehicles do
you suppose are in daily operation on the highways and streets
in the State of Ohio alone? We have no means of knowing the
exact number, but it would include vehicles of almost every
Federal Agency-Army, Navy, Post Office, etc., just to mention
a few-which agencies before the Tort Claims Act could have
permitted their men to drive in practically any manner they
pleased, inflicting everything short of outright murder on the
general public-injuries formerly compensable only by the
graciousness of Special Act of Congress. Under the F. T. C. A.,
injured plaintiffs now can recover without exasperating "red
tape," where the Government's liability is clear. In addition,
there are numerous suits pending-including six in this district
alone-resulting from collisions between military aircraft and
commercial planes. Consider, too, the fact that the Federal Gov-
ernment, owning approximately 22 percent of the entire land in
the United States, is the nation's largest land owner. As such,
and by virtue of the employer and employee relation, it must
respond in damages in an appropriate proceeding, just as must
any other landlord or employer.
I do not mean to imply that the field is limited to personal
injury claims alone. The same rules are applicable to the entire
tort field.
Defenses
Suppose you start an F. T. C. A. suit. It is not as easy to
collect as it might seem at first glance. Let's look at some of the
curves those of us whose duty it is to represent the United States
might pitch back at you upon the receipt of your complaint. Since
Title 28, U. S. C., Section 1346 (b) provides for liability "in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred," it follows that the same defenses which exist under
State law apply to Federal Torts. Then, as was said in Noe v.
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United States: 8 "Under the (Tort Claims) Act, the United States
fixes the limits of its liability, the primary limit being that lia-
bility which arises from the relation of master and servant. If that
relationship does not exist, the United States has excluded lia-
bility by withholding its consent to be liable." Hopson v. United
States9 said that: "Liability under the Act cannot be predicated
upon the alleged negligence of an independent contractor or its
employees." Then too, of course, there is the old standby defense
-- contributory negligence.
There is an additional factor, stated in Title 28, U. S. C.,
Section 2401 (b), which imposes a two-year statute of limitations
after the claim accrues. Section "a," which is the general section,
provides for its tolling for any person under legal disability. How-
ever, since this wording is not used in the tort section "b," this re-
lief is not afforded there.
The Department of Justice and the United States Attorney's
Office have no shortage of business, and do not desire these few
remarks to be construed as an invitation to be sued. However,
we do hope they may be of some small assistance, 10 should some
client come to your office under an appropriate set of circum-
stances involving a claim against the Government's Agencies.
8 Noe v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 639 (D. C. Tenn., 1956).
9 Hopson v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 804 (D. C. Ark., 1956).
10 For a new and detailed treatment of F. T. C. A., see, Wright, Federal Tort
Claims Act Analyzed & Annotated (1957).
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